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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-
3(2)(i), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) as an Appeal from a final order denying 
Petitioner's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge 
Frank G. Noel, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly refuse to set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, a Decree of Divorce based upon a stipulation? 
The standard of review is that the trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a 
motion for relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and its 
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 
1117 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Did the trial court correctly enforce the stipulation of the parties? 
The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside 
the parties stipulation. Dove v. Cude. 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985). 
3. Whether it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to set aside the Decree of Divorce 
which was based on a stipulation based on a Rule 60(b) Motion, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
where the Appellant had freely executed the stipulation and thereafter communicated her 
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repudiation of the Stipulation after the Decree had been submitted to the Court for signature and 
entry? 
The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Ostler v. Buhlen 
957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW ON APPEAL 
Other than the body of common law cited herein, the determinative law on appeal is Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which is attached hereto in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Tie Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Appellant" or "Vicki") and Appellee 
(hereinafter referred to as "Appellee" or "David") were husband and wife having been married on 
the 10th day of June, 1988. R. 1. 
2. Vicki filed her Complaint for Divorce in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about February 6, 1996 through her attorney, Matt 
Biljanic. R. 1. 
3. Vicki filed for an Order to Show Cause seeking temporary orders to govern during 
the pendency of this action on or about February 23, 1996 which hearing was held before the 
Honorable Commissioner Lisa A. Jones on or about March 1, 1996. R. 12. 
4. David filed his answer in this action on or about March 4, 1996. R. 31- 36. 
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5. On or about March 11, 1996, Vicki served her first set of discovery upon David. 
R. 37. 
6. On or about September 9, 1996, Vicki filed a Motion to Compel responses to her 
discovery. R. 42. 
7. On or about October 31, 1996 counsel for Vicki (Matt Biljanic) withdrew from 
this action. R. 49. 
8. On or about November 20, 1996, counsel for Vicki entered his appearane again in 
this action by submitting a notice of hearing on his motion to compel and an appearance of 
counsel. R. 51-52. 
9. On or about December 13, 1996, David submitted his discovery responses to 
Vicki's first set of discovery. R. 56. 
10. On or about April 30, 1997, Vicki's second counsel in this matter, Daniel Darger, 
filed his notice of appearance of counsel. R. 60. 
11. Vicki's new counsel filed a Motion to Void Antenuptual Agreement and Award 
Suit Money. R. 61-129. 
12. A hearing was set on the Motion to Void Antenuptual Agreement and Award Suit 
Money on October 23, 1997 before the Honorable Commissioner Lisa Jones. R. 130. 
13. At the hearing on the motion, Commissioner Jones determined that factual findings 
were required and denied the motion stating that the validity of the antenuptual agreement was a 
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trial issue. R. 140. 
14. Vicki filed an objection to the Commissioner's recommendation on her Motion to 
Void Antenuptual Agreement. R. 141-143. 
15. On or about December 4, 1997, Vicki filed a second request for production of 
documents. R. 143. 
16. On or about January 8, 1998, Vicki filed a Subpoena Deuces Tecum to produce 
documents in the possession of Robert Pusey, the attorney who drafted the antenuptual 
agreement. R. 150. 
16. On or about March 1, 1998, David filed his responses to Vicki's set second of 
discovery requests. R. 153. 
17. On or about April 30, 1998, Vicki executed the Stipulation and Property 
Settlement Agreement which was received by the Court on May 14, 1998. R. 160-171. 
18. On or about May 12, 1998, David filed a Notice to Submit for Decision which was 
received by the Court on May 14, 1998, together with copies of the Decree of Divorce and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 172. 
19. On or about May 18, 1998, Vicki's counsel, Daniel Darger filed a Notice of 
Withdrawal of Counsel mailing the same to David's counsel on that same date. R. 174-175. 
20. On May 19, 1998, the Court entered the Decree of Divorce and the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law which had been approved as to form by Daniel Darger. R. 176-182. 
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21. On or about May 21, 1998, Mr. Richman filed his appearance of counsel as 
counsel for Vicki. R. 183. 
22. On or about June 1, 1998, Vicki filed her Motion Under Rule 60(b)(2)(3)(7)URCP 
to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 186-244. 
23. A hearing was set on the Motion on June 26, 1998 before the Honorable Judge 
Frank G. Noel and then rescheduled to July 10, 1998. R. 247 and 249. 
24. On or about June 22, 1998, David filed his Memorandum in Reply to Motion to 
Set Aside Decree, Findings of Fact ad Conclusionsof Law and To Void Stipulation. R. 251-383. 
25. At the hearing on the Motion, the Court did not have in the file David's 
Memorandum in Reply and so another copy was furnished to the Court. R. 384-515. 
26. Oral argument was held before the Honorable Judge Frank G. Noel during which 
argument Vicki completed her opening argument and shortly after David began his argument, a 
bomb threat occurred. 
27. The Court took the matter under advisement. R. 516. 
28. On or about July 17, 1998, the Court entered its Minute Entry denying Vicki's 
Motion. R. 517-18. 
29. On or about July 27, 1998, counsel for David submitted an order to Vicki's 
counsel to which Vicki's counsel filed an objection. R. 520-22; 523-25. 
30. On or about August 4, 1998, Vicki filed the Affidavit of Sherry Epperson. R. 526-
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31. 
31. On or about August 4, 1998, Vicki filed a Motion for Rehearing. R. 531-37. 
32. On or about September 25, 1998, David filed his Memorandum in Reply to Motion 
for Rehearing. R. 545-60. 
33. On or about September 30, 1998, the Court entered its Minute Entry denying 
Vicki's Motion for Rehearing. R. 561. 
34. On or about November 13, 1998, the Court entered its Order on Motion to Set 
Aside Decree, Fndings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Void Stipulation. R. 563-565. 
35. On or about November 25, 1998, Vicki withdrew her objection to the proposed 
order. R. 569-70. 
36. On or about December 9, 1998, Vicki filed her Notice of Appeal in this action. R. 
575. 
B. FACTUAL HISTORY 
1. Vicki and David were husband and wife having been married on the 10th day of 
June, 1988. R. 1. 
2. Prior to their marriage, the parties entered into an Antenuptual Agreement which 
was drafted by attorney Robert Pusey. R. 485. 
3. Mr. Pusey first drafted an antenuptual agreement which was signed by the parties 
in the presence of witnesses and notarized and included hand written lists of property which each 
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party disclosed ownership of to the other party including the approximate value thereof. R. 486; 
492-500. 
4. After the execution of the initial antenuptual agreement, the parties returned to Mr. 
Pusey's office requesting changes be made. R. 486-487. 
5. Mr. Pusey prepared a second antenuptual agreement, this time typing up the lists 
of property disclosed. R. 487; 501-507. 
6. At the time the parties came into his office to pick up and sign the second 
antenuptual agreement, Mr. Pusey inquired as to both parties concerning the desired changes, 
retrieved the parties' copies of the first agreement, throwing them in the trash and ripping up the 
copy which he had retained in his filing first marking that document "revoked." R. 487-488. 
7. The second antenuptual agreement was signed in Mr. Pusey's presence, notarized 
by him, but due to the short notice and the parties appearing at his office without an appointment 
there were no witnesses. R. 488. 
8. Vicki filed her Complaint for Divorce in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about February 6, 1996 through her attorney, Matt 
Biljanic. R. 1. 
9. During the course of the litigation, which spanned two years, Vicki had two 
attorneys prior to her present attorney and sought discovery on two separate occassions. R. 37, 
60 and 143. 
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10. During the course of the litigation, Vicki filed a motion to void the antenuptual 
agreement which was denied but reserved for the trial in this matter. R. 61-129; 140. 
11. On or about April 30, 1998, and after considerable negotiations with counsel, 
Vicki signed the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. R. 160-171. 
12. The Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement contained a Verification 
which stated 
On this the 30th day of April, 1998, personally appeared before me, Vicki L. 
Stratton, the Plaintiff in the above encaptioned action, and having been first duly 
sworn and upon her oath states that she is the Plaintiff in the above encaptioned 
action, that she is over the age of eighteen years, that she has read the foregoing 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, that she agrees to be bound by the 
terms hereof and that she signed the same of her own free will. 
R. 167. 
13. The Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement were filed with the Court on 
or about May 14, 1998. R. 160. 
14. On or about May 14, 1998, Vicki signed and filed with the Court an Affidavit of 
Jurisdiction and Grounds, which was notarized and approved as to form by her attorney, Daniel 
Darger, in which Affidavit she stated 
7. That the Defendant and I entered into a Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement which has been filed with the Court. I have reviewed that Document 
and found that it contained both my signature and the signature of my spouse. I 
believe that this is a fair and equitable division of the marital estate. 
R. 170. 
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15. On or about May 12, 1998, David filed a Notice to Submit for Decision which 
was received by the Court on May 14, 1998, together with copies of the Decree of Divorce and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and other related documents. R. 172. 
16. On or about May 13, 1998, David's attorney received a telephone call from Mr. 
Richard Leedy, an attorney purporting to speak for Vicki in this action who stated that Vicki was 
repudiating the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. R. 385. 
17. Following receipt of this telephone call from Mr. Leedy, David's counsel contacted 
Daniel Darger and asked what was going on. Mr. Darger informed David's counsel that Mr. 
Leedy was not counsel of record, he had not been terminated as counsel of record, and that he 
believed the matter was a done deal. R. 385. 
18. David's counsel informed Mr. Darger that he believed the matter was resolved and 
he intended to let the divorce be entered. R. 385. 
19. On or about May 18, 1998, Vicki's counsel, Daniel Darger filed a Notice of 
Withdrawal of Counsel mailing the same to David's counsel on that same date which was received 
by David's counsel on May 20, 1998. R. 174-175; 385. 
20. On May 19, 1998, the Court entered the Decree of Divorce and the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law which had been approved as to form by Daniel Darger. R. 176-182. 
21. The Court entered the Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on May 19, 1998. R. 176-182. 
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22. Thereafter, Vicki's present counsel filed his appearance, filed his Rule 60(b) 
Motion, a hearing was held, the matter taken under advisement, and the Court denied the Motion. 
R. 183, 186-244, 247, 249 and 516. 
23. Following the denial of the initial Rule 60(b) motion, Vicki filed her motion for 
rehearing which the Court denied. R. 531-37; 561. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation, Decree 
of Divore, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. There was no abuse of discretion in so 
doing. The stipulation was freely entered into and executed by Vicki. Vicki failed to properly put 
forth arguments under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which would provide the 
Court with any basis to set aside the resulting Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact. The Court 
properly bound Vicki to the terms of her agreement which was memorialized in the Stipulation 
and Property Settlement Agreement and in denying the effect of any alleged repudiation. Because 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion, this Court should affirm its ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO SET ASIDE, 
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, A DEREE OF DIVORCE WHICH WAS BASED UPON A 
FREELY EXECUTED STIPULATION. 
The trial court correctly refused to set aside the Decree of Divorce which was based on a 
freely executed stipulation signed by the Appellant. The Court correctly denied the Motion to Set 
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Aside the Decree filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard 
of review is that the trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from a 
judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and its determination will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court properly denied Vicki's Motion to Set Aside the Decree and Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. Additionally, the trial court properly refused to permit Vicki to 
bootstrap her arguments concerning the validity or lack thereof of the parties antenuptual 
agreement as a basis for setting aside a Decree and Findings which was based not on the 
antenuptual agreement but rather on a freely executed and enforceable stipulation. 
A. THE ANTENUPTUAL AGREEMENT 
David believes that the antenuptual agreement was irrelevant to the Motion before the trial 
court other than the fact that Vicki had ample time to seek an evidentiary hearing to attempt to 
void that agreement. Further, David agrees that by accepting the terms of the Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement, Vicki waived her right to assert the antenuptual agreement as a 
basis for any action by the trial court. Nonetheless, Vicki focused much of her argument for 
basing the Motion below on the circumstances surrounding its execution and the enforceability of 
this antenuptual agreement. While David did not believe that such an issue was relevant, 
Respondent nonetheless addressed Vicki's arguments. 
Prior to the parties marriage, the parties caused an antenuptual agreement to be drafted 
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and the same was executed,,, R. 483-490. The agreement was drafted, by Robert: Pusej R 183. 
During the course o; u^ iingation, counse. ...: , icki ::^u .-. . : , , ntenuptual 
Agreement and Award Suit Money to determine the validity and enforceability of said agreement. 
R 6] -120 Tn her Motion and Affidavit, Vicki alleged that she did not have sufficient time to 
'••* •*" - i: e ::: it it l e i: it ai I :::! till: lat til: le alii i ::: ::: f tl le assets v\ ei e i lot::(: i ill) disclosed to hei 1 1 63. 69-
'"0. In response to said motion, David filed an affidavit of Robert Puse\ K +83-490 Alter oial 
argument on the motion, the Commissioner run.u .:.„. . -. i. . u _iu .-* "ii: 
disclosure occurred, and the scope thereof required factual determinations which would be 
reserved for trial in this matter,,. R. 1.40; 144-45. 
• ' • i llatic i i on, t he anteni iptual 
agreement, ;' .• >" Vicki argued that full disclosure was not made prior to the execution of said 
to take deposition^,
 v^. .50-51), perform discovery (R. 38, 153) and otherwise uncover all assets 
which were allegedly not disclosed prior to the execution of the antenuptual agreement. In fact, 
Vicki rather argued initially without disclosing the source, that she was 
allegedly in possession, of newly discovered evidence, but she failed, to properly set forth, the 
in LMSI III is 11 v ill i III v\ i i In mi ir i I mi in il ill ill il Hi in i lire" ' ^ ' , | U '*"*'' ""«-««»»• "-^sonablr ilili^cm c pi mi h » I he 
execution of the stipulation,. (R„. 197, 199-200) Suet- newly discovered, evidence, was in fact, 
not a valid basis under the circumstances foi tin ...... . ;, .:;.. ie tl i.e deci ee. 
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Vicki argued that her signature on the antenuptual agreement was a forgery and that 
David caused the forged agreement to be submitted to the Court. R. 200-201. However, at the 
time of her Motion to determine the validity of said agreement, she did not allege that the 
agreement was forged. R. 61-126. 
Petitioner argued that a conflict of interest existed and that material misrepresentations 
were made which would invalidate the antenuptual agreement. R. 201. However, no conflict of 
interest, real or perceived, influenced the preparation or execution of the stipulation. R. 350-358. 
Further, some of the allegations concerning the alleged conflict of interest are simply not true. 
Mr. Pusey set forth each and every contact he had with David in his affidavit. R. 350-358. At no 
time had Mr. Pusey represented Mr. Stratton nor Mr. Stratton's company. R. 350-358. The mere 
fact that Mr. Stratton paid the bill for the preparation of the antenuptual agreement does not in 
and of itself create a conflict of interest. See Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7. l 
David did not mislead Vicki concerning the antenuptual agreement or its terms. As 
evidenced by Mr. Pusey's affidavit, the agreement was negotiated and in fact modified at the 
request of Vicki. R. 350-358. While it is true that David informed Vicki that his business partner 
wanted him to execute such an agreement and that the agreement was prepared in anticipation of 
1
 "Conflict of interest: general rule" and the comment thereto stating that it is not a conflict 
of interest stating that a lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client if the client is 
informed of that fact consents, and accepting such payments do not compromise the attorney's 
loyalty to his client. 
Page - 1 7 -
the parties marriage, he did not misuse any trust which the Vicki may have placed in him. Rather, 
he was attempting to protect his premarital assets and any increase in value thereof in the event 
that the mat • **<** " ended in di :: i *e. 
David does not believe that the enforceability or lack thereof of the antenuptual agreement 
the trial court. Hie Decree and Findings were entered based on the Stipulation and Property 
settlement agreement. Any underlying assumptions which Vicki may have held concerning the 
i ' - .,.-*! prfor eahi- " of the stipulation and the resulting orders 
based thereon. The trial court torrectK ruled that the stipulation and resulting orders were 
enfor i . -
B. RULE 60(b) 
Dav - ,-ieves that the trial court correctly ruLvi ;;.*;* ,,,, :ecree and I 'indings si lould not 
be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in the relevant parts, state 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court ma) in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic 
or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) ; (5) ; 
(6). . . ; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3) or (4) not more 
than 3 months after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken, A motion 
under this Subsection (b) does not affect the finality of the judgment or suspend its 
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operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining relief from a judgment shall be made by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
C. Rule 60(b)(2) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Vicki's Motion under Rule 
60(b)(2). In order for Vicki to have prevailed on the basis of newly discovered evidence, she had 
to show that the new evidence "by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 
for a new trial" and that such evidence was of sufficient substance that there would be a 
reasonable likelihood of a different result." Kettner v. Snow, 375 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 1962). Thus, 
she had the burden of proving that she has discovered new evidence, that the evidence could not 
have been discovered by due diligence, that the discovered evidence was of sufficient substance 
that there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result based on that evidence, and that the 
motion was timely filed. David conceded that the Motion was timely filed before the trial court. 
R. 393. However, he believed that Vicki failed to meet all other burdens to prevail based on 
Rule 60(b)(2). R. 384-397. 
First, Vicki failed to meet her burden concerning the discovery of new evidence. Vicky 
initially alleged in general vague and nebulous statements that subsequent to the execution of the 
stipulation that she has learned that substantial properties were hidden from her during the marital 
period and were not considered in entering the stipulation. R. 192-215. Vicki failed to set forth 
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any evidence which she has allegedly discovered, in, this matter subsequent to the execution of the 
stipulation which meets her burden, under Rule 60(b)(2)., R 1,92 21,5. Aftei till: le coin 1:1 lad ei itei e i 
its ruling denying the motion, Vicki filed the Affidavit of Shen'v f- nperson and attempted to use 
this as basis to have another bite at her motion, through a request, ror rehearing. R. 526-530., The 
Coi in I: ienie ::! that i eqi ic: st. K 561-6,2. 
Second , this d ivorce action was ongoing for approximately t w o years following the filing 
and pr ior t o its resolut ion by stipulation . ;n^ univ J I ining nc. .s ai id is 
represented by her third attorney. R. 4^-50,52-53, 00, 174-75, and 183-8 ,. \;cki's first 
attorney sought discovery and filed a Motion to Compel to enforce that discover/ R 38; 42-43 
Da id i ;:! spoi ided to said disco ei j pi o1' idii lg i i ill. ai id :>t lses 1]- 56-5 7. No 
additional Motions to Compel based on incomplete answers or failure to respond were filed in this 
action,. V icki's second attoi i ie> additionall > pe i foi n led discov ei > ai id soi igl it t :> take tl i.e 
deposition of Mr. Pusey. R. 150-52, 154-57. Vicki had ample time to seek the depositions of 
the David's financial institutions, business and any other entity which she felt may have 
i : oncerning David's financial condition. V icki failed to provide the Court with any 
information concerning how, through due diligence, the alleged newly discovered evidence could 
i 
Third, Vicki failed to provide the Court: with any basis to conclude that she would prevail 
on all claim based on the newly discovered evidence. The only allegation she niak.es concerning 
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this element is that she believes she is likely to prevail on the issues of the antenuptual agreement 
and alimony if those issues go to trial. 
Vicki failed to meet her burden under Rule 60(b)(2). The trial correct properly denied her 
motions and did not abuse its discretion in so doing 
Rule 60(b)(3) 
Vicki's Motion failed under Rule 60(b)(3) concerning allegations of fraud, 
misrepresentation or misconduct on the part of David. First, all allegations of fraud must be pled 
with particularity. In Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 256 (Utah App. 1993), the Court set 
forth the elements of fraud which must be proven by its proponent, 
(1) that a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing fact; (3) which was 
false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly knowing 
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation; (5) for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby 
induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Despain at 256, footnote 1, citing to Schuman v. Green River Motel. 835 P.2d 992, 994 (Utah 
App. 1992)(quoting Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952). In the present case, 
Vicki failed to set forth the allegations in her motion. R. 186-215. Further, any allegation of 
fraud which she may have put forth went not to the circumstances surrounding the execution of 
the stipulation but rather on the alleged circumstances surrounding the execution of the 
antenuptual agreement. R. 192-215. Vicki failed to provide the Court with any basis for finding 
a misrepresentation or misconduct by the David surrounding her execution of the stipulation 
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which would provide a basis for this Court setting aside the Decree and Findings, The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the decree and findings. 
E. Rule 60(b)(7) 
Vicki attempted to appeal to the Court's sense of justice to permit her to be relieved from 
parties to adhere to the bargains in which they freely enter. There is no other reason to set aside 
the Decree and Findings in this case. 
VVU executed the ^ lation and property settlement agi cement on or about April 30, 
1998 R 160-163A. On or about \Ia\ ' * I wfc. counsel for Respondent received a telephone 
message :. . •* '••'••'•* ; 
Mr. Falk that Vicki wished to repudiate the stipulation. R 385, At no time did Mr. Leedy make 
any representation concerning his authority to speak, on behalf of > icki i ioi tl mat 1 i = • had bee t i 
retained as counsel. R. J 8 I X Upon the termination of the telephone call tv> A ^ . Leedy, Mr. Falk 
called Mr. Darger, then counsel for Vicki and asked if he had been terminated and what was going 
mi I" i i i I II l>ainu inliiiMK'il Mi I ill ilium In li ml nil il lnvn Ih liiiinainl Unit (hat he had been 
advised that Vicki had gone to see Mr. Leedy.. R. 385. Mi Falk. informed Mr. Darger that he 
bdirvnl lltr malli i * on if tit In I and Ilia I In ink mini In fiiuu i ti vuili Ilium 11 it Mipulaliun and ulhcr 
documents for the Court's execution. R. 385. Mr. Falk further informed Mr. Darger that if the 
Petitioner wished to file a Motion to Set Aside, he would respond upon receipt otherwise he 
Page -2 2 -
intended to complete the action. 
On or about May 14, 1998, the stipulation, findings and decree together with a notice to 
submit for decision were filed with the Court. R. R. 160-182. Subsequent to that filing, Mr. 
Darger withdrew as counsel on May 18, 1998. R. 174-75. Counsel for David did not initiate any 
proceedings or take any other action in this matter in violation of Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. All such actions occurred prior to the withdrawal of the Petitioner's then 
counsel. 
There were no other reasons which justified the trial Court setting aside the decree and 
findings. Vicki freely entered an agreement about which she became unhappy. Vicki was free to 
not execute the agreement. However, she choose to accept the terms therein. Merely because 
Vicki is an individual who believes that she should be relieved of the bargains which she 
knowingly, voluntarily and freely entered did not provide a basis for the trial court to set aside the 
Decree and Findings. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENFORED THE STIPULATION OF 
THE PARTIES WHICH WAS FREELY ENTERED INTO BY THE 
APPELLANT. 
The trial court correctly enforced the stipulation of the parties which was freely entered 
into by the Appellant. The trial court correctly found that there was no basis to set aside the 
decree of divorce upon the filing of a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to set 
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aside the parties stipulator ve v. Cude, 710 P 2d i 70 (Utah 1985). 
V icki and David entered an enforceable stipulation which was property enforced by the 
trial court. To enforce such a stipulation was not an abuse of discretion. After extensive 
negotiations in this matter, on or about April 30, 1998 counsel for David prepared and submitted 
1 ' > , - • ' i - . . - -
Agreement.. R 160-163A. Contrary to the anuiments put forth n the trial court, at no time did 
counsel for David discuss any portion of the S;.^.„. , . . Settlement Agicemuil ilh 
Vicki. R. 387. 
The stipulation and property settlement agreement entered into between the parties to this 
'* SK-^I , \ mown. 44 P.2d <33, 334-35 (Utah 
App. 1987), the Court of Appeals set forth the elements of when a stipulation is enforceable. It i 
Brown, the Coui t stated, 
A promise or agreement with reference to a pending judicial proceeding, made by a party 
to the proceeding or his attorney, is binding without consideration By statute or rule of 
court such an agreement is generally binding only (a) if it is in writing and signed by the 
party or attorney, or (b) if it is made or admitted in the presence of the court, or (c) to the 
extent that justice requires enforcement in view of a material change of position in reliance 
on the promise or agreement. 
iiiowi i. at 33 t c itii ig t :> **<*<>+** ** » «« ^  ' > • id) :)f C :)iiti acts , Sectioi I 9 :l (1981); See also Kinsman \ 
Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 212 (I'tah \pp. 1988) and Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P 2d 1057, 1059 
(Utah App. 1990). 
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In the present case, the stipulation and property settlement agreement was in writing. 
Further, Vicki signed the stipulation and property settlement agreement assenting to the terms 
therein. R. 160-163 A. Said signature was duly notarized. R. 162-163. In addition thereto, the 
verification on the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement stated, 
On this the 30th day of April 1998, personally appeared before me, Vicki L. Stratton, the 
Plaintiff in the above encaptioned action, and having been first duly sworn and upon her 
oath states that she is the Plaintiff in the above encaptioned action, that she is over the age 
of eighteen years, that she has read the foregoing Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement, that she agrees to be bound by the terms hereof and that she signed the same 
of her own free will. 
R. 167. In addition to this express agreement to be bound by the terms of the Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement, Vicki executed an Affidavit of Jurisdiction and Grounds in which 
she affirmatively expressed the following: 
7. That the Defendant and I entered into a Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement which has been filed with the Court. I have reviewed that Document and 
found that it contained both my signature and the signature of my spouse. I believe that 
this is a fair and equitable division of the marital estate. R. 170. 
Clearly, the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement was in writing and clearly evidenced 
Vicki's assent to its terms and understanding that it was to become an enforceable order of the 
Court. Further, she clearly stated in her Affidavit of Jurisdictions and Grounds that she believed 
the division of marital assets was fair and equitable. R. 170. While it is true that in making an 
equitable distribution in a divorce proceeding, the Court is to look at all of the assets acquired by 
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the parties during the course of the marriage, it is also true that a marital asset is any right that has 
accrued during the marriage to a present or future benefit. Jefferies v. Jetierivs, * • , - U 5 J ; ; 
837 (Utah App. 1995). However, the parties executed an antenuptual agreement which may or 
may not have changed the character of certain assets which may have either been, acquired or 
assets was never presented to the Court based on the parties mutual agreement to resolve the 
issues upon stipulation.. As such, it was not an. abuse u a:^;a. . : ;; . . . . . , : . -. ..>L .. 
set aside the stipulation. 
The trial court considered the issue of waiver determining that Vicki, by her execution of 
Court specifically noted that Vicki had previously filed a Motion to Void the Antenuptual 
Agreement based on the grounds of i londisclosui e of ii lfoi matic i 1. : stei isibl> ti le san i.e gi oui ids 
upon which she sought to set aside the decree. R. 564. While Vicki now wishes to highlight the 
elements of waiver as to each particular item of property had the antenuptual agreement been 
voided through an evidentiary hearing, the trial court specifically noted that the waiver was of the 
right to test the validity of that antenuptual agreement R 564 It is immaterial whether Vicki 
waiu.Ml lici iiglill ii . I mi [iiinlH (illliii Mi in nil pinpi'il;, i1* hn III in,ii In i r tveti Hihfnrl In line In ms nl 
the antenuptual agreement What is evident, that Vicki had the • j^hi ,»ie--; tne antenuptual 
agreement through an evidentiary hearing, V icki was ou\ K.UMV aware of .... ;u:- •>• 
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validity of the antenuptual agreement as she had in fact previously done so. R. 61-67. Finally, 
Vicki intentionally relinquished that right by executing the stipulation and property settlement 
agreement. The trial court correctly, implicitely if not explicitely, found that Vicki had waived 
her rights by executing the stipulation and property settlement agreement. R. 566-68. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion. 
Vicki's affidavit filed in support of her Motion to Set Aside did not provide any basis for 
that court to void the stipulation and property settlement agreement. R. 232-38. Vicki's 
allegation that she had expended substantial sums in attorney fees in the prosecution of the 
divorce did not provide grounds to void the stipulation. R. 197. In fact, during the course of the 
pending divorce the parties marital residence was sold and the proceeds therefrom were divided 
equally between the parties. R 181. Petitioner's assertion that Respondent had not paid his 
temporary alimony for the months of November 1997 through April 1998 did not form a basis to 
void the stipulation. Specifically, the stipulation contained a provision awarding Vicki the unpaid 
sum of alimony. R. 162. 
Vicki's allegations of coercion were without merit. R. 196-97. If Vicki's attorney pushed 
her into executing an agreement which she did not wish to execute, she could have terminated his 
services prior to that execution. Any ill advice received by her counsel may justify some 
independent action, but did not provide grounds to void the stipulation. Further, Vicki's 
independent financial pressures are not relevant. R. 197. Nearly all parties to divorce actions 
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undergo substantial financial hardships. 
There was no misconduct on the part of David. Petitioner first made vague and nebulous 
allegations concerning hidden assets and material misrepresentations without providing specificity 
or substance, and only after the motion had been denied did she attempt to have the matter 
reheared by providing some specificity but without providing any reasonable basis for why that 
evidence could not have been discovered with due diligence in the two years the case had been 
pending. R. 197-98; 561-62; 526-30; and 531-37. In fact, the real basis for Petitioner seeking to 
void the stipulation is that the Petitioner, subsequent to freely executing the stipulation, became 
unhappy with the bargain to which she assented. It was not until after the trial court had denied 
her motion and Vicki sought a rehearing on the matter, did she provide the court with any 
specificity concerning her allegations through the submission of the affidavit of Sherry Epperson. 
R. 526-30. 
There was no basis for the Court to void the stipulation. The stipulation fully complied 
with the formalities required for enforcement under Utah law. A party who freely executes a 
stipulation should not be relieved from the terms thereof merely because she later decides that she 
is not happy with the terms of her agreement. Based thereon, it was not an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to deny the motion to set aside the stipulation. 
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m . THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
TO SET ASIDE A DECREE OF DIVORCE BASED ON A STIPULATION 
WHERE THE APPELLANT REPUDIATED THE STIPULATION AFTER 
ITS EXECUTION AND FILING WITH THE COURT FOR ENTRY OF 
THE DECREE. 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the tria court to refuse to set aside the Decree of 
Divorce which was based on a stipulation based on a Rule 60(b) Motion, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, where the Appellant had freely executed the stipulation and thereafter communicated 
her repudiation of the Stipulation after the Decree had been submitted to the Court for signature 
and entry. The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Ostler v. 
Buhler. 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998). 
There is no basis under Utah law for a party to unilaterally "repudiate" an enforceable 
stipulation. Once executed, the agreement is enforceable if it meets the requirements of the law. 
Merely because Vicki no longer wished to be bound by her word does not grant a party to a 
contract the right to unilaterally terminate the same. Furthermore, Vicki has failed to provide the 
Court with any legal basis for her argument that she had the right to unilaterally repudiate the 
Stipulation. There is no legal basis for one party to a stipulation and property settlement 
agreement to attempt to repudiate the terms thereof after the agreement has been duly executed 
and notarized. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Vicki's Motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial Court correctly denied the Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Decree of 
Divorce. Appellant should be bound by the terms of the agreement which she freely executed. It 
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enforce the stipulation and the resulting decree 
of divorce. This court should affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Dated and Signed this S day of May, 1999. 
Frank J. F a l k / / 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
Appellee Adopts the Addendum Submitted by Appellant in this Action. 
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